Appellate attorney Anne Grignon joins Tim Kowal and Jeff Lewis to discuss her recent win in Banc of California v. Superior Court from an order compelling arbitration. Anne discusses when and why to take a writ from nonappealable orders. The attorney then turn to private judging generally, discussing Justice Segal's recent caution about the industry's potential overuse of that privately compensated judges, and Presiding Justice Kline's similar sentiment that "private judging is an oxymoron" and is "undermining public justice.” Anne shares three tips for your next appellate brief, before the three discuss some recent cases, including strategies to consider in approaching statements of decision.

Appellate Specialist Anne Grignon's biography and LinkedIn profile.

Appellate Specialist Jeff Lewis' biography, LinkedIn profile, and Twitter feed.

Appellate Specialist Tim Kowal's biography, LinkedIn profile, and Twitter feed.

Cases and other resources mentioned in this episode:

Banc of California v. Superior Court (D2 Sep. 27, 2021) no. B310190
Jolie v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (D2d7 Jul. 23, 2021) no. B308958
Presiding Justice Anthony Kline's comments on private judging courtesy SCAN
Brown v. TGS Mgm't Co 57 Cal.App.5th 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
Pettie v. Amazon.com, Inc. (D4d2 Sep. 21, 2021) 2021 WL 4270631 (no. E074241) (nonpub. opn.)
Hakenjos Hall Prof. Svcs, Inc. v. Korte/Schwartz, Inc. (D4d1 Jun. 17, 2021) 2021 WL 2461132 (nonpub. opn.).
Legendary Builders Corp. v. Grovewood Properties, LLC (D2d4 Oct. 5,2021) 2021 WL 4550995 (nos. B297299, B301777) (nonpub. opn.).

Tim Kowal helps trial attorneys and clients win their cases and avoid error on appeal. He co-hosts the Cal. Appellate Law Podcast at www.CALPodcast.com, and publishes a newsletter of appellate tips for trial attorneys at www.tvalaw.com/articles. His appellate practice covers all of California's appellate districts and throughout the Ninth Circuit, with appellate attorneys in offices in Orange County and Monterey County. Contact Tim at tkowal@tvalaw.com or (714) 641-1232.

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Another recent case instructs plaintiffs not to think they can reverse a defense judgment by arguing that "substantial evidence" supported a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. Instead, to overcome a defense verdict, a plaintiff must establish on appeal that the evidence was so overwhelming and uncontroverted that findings for the plaintiff were "compelled as a matter of law." Plaintiffs can almost never meet this burden, and the plaintiff in Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (D2d3 Nov. 29, 2021) 2021 WL 5563958 (no. B302178) (nonpub. opn.) could not meet it, either.

Also of note: The plaintiff did prevail on one claim, but did not beat the employer's 998 offer. But when the employer moved to tax costs, it did not attach the 998 offer to the moving papers. It attached it instead to the reply papers. Held: it was an abuse of discretion to consider the 998 offer if not attached to the motion itself.

The "Finding Compelled as a Matter of Law" Standard of Review:

The plaintiff-employee claimed a disability arising from his sleep apnea (which is a recognized FEHA disability) complicated by obesity (which is not). The plaintiff was able only to get 2-3 hours of sleep each night, and as a result fell asleep on his sales job multiple times each day. The plaintiff was given 60 days' disability leave, but when the plaintiff asked for months' more, the employer concluded it could not hold out that long and filled the plaintiff's position. The jury returned a defense verdict.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued the uncontroverted evidence established the employer put the plaintiff on unpaid leave because of his disability, so he was entitled to a finding as a matter of law. To his credit, the plaintiff appears to have been aware of his high burden on appeal. "When the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof failed to carry that burden and that party appeals,” the question on appeal is “ ‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’ ” (Petitpas v. Ford Motor Co. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 261, 302.) Specifically, the appellant must establish his evidence was “ ‘(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.) Under this standard, “it is almost impossible” for a plaintiff “to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his favor. That is because unless the [trier of fact] makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing plaintiff, we presume the [trier of fact] found plaintiff's evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof.” (Bookout v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486 (Bookout).)

Here, the appellate court found the plaintiff did not meet that high burden. The employer obviously knew the plaintiff was suffering from obesity, but that is not a recognized disability. The plaintiff did not show, by uncontroverted evidence compelling a finding as a matter of law, that the employer was aware of the plaintiff's sleep apnea. One of the employer-defendants witnesses testified she did not know about the sleep apnea when the plaintiff was placed on leave. That was enough to support the verdict and doom the appeal.

No Structural Error in Limiting Trial Time to 7.5 Hours Per Side:

The plaintiff also argued on appeal that he was deprived of the opportunity to put on his entire case because the trial court limited his trial time to 7.5 hours. Although the plaintiff had provided a trial estimate of 10 days, the court only provided five days. But the appellate court found no prejudicial error. Trial management is vested in the trial court's discretion. The plaintiff was "not caught by surprise," because the five-day limit was announced before trial began. And the plaintiff did not use his allotted time wisely by asking witnesses questions repeatedly.

More importantly, the plaintiff did not establish how the short trial time prejudiced him. "He does not explain how the verdict would have been different if he had more time to, say, cross-examine the ExakTime employee, or present other evidence he has not identified."

The lesson here is that if you spot any structural defects or irregularities at trial, these need to be raised immediately by motion for mistrial, and possibly a writ petition in the Court of Appeal. Appellate courts are leery when trial anomalies are raised for the first time on appeal.

Motion to Tax Denied For Failing to Attach 998 Offer (Which Was Probably Defective):

The plaintiff did win on one claim for failing to engage in the interactive process, and awarded him $130,088. The plaintiff sought his costs, but the defendant moved to tax costs on the basis that the plaintiff did not beat the defendants Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer of $500,000.

But there were two problems with the defendant's 998 argument.

First, the 998 offer was vague and self-contradictory. At one point, the $500,000 offer was expressed as "not includ[ing] Plaintiff's costs and attorneys' fees incurred." And at another point the $500,000 was described as including "costs and expenses."

Second, the defendant failed to attach the 998 offer to its motion to tax. The defendant attached the 998 to its reply papers, and the trial court considered it. But the Court of Appeal held that was an abuse of discretion. “[T]he inclusion of additional evidentiary matter with the reply should only be allowed in the exceptional case ...” and if permitted, the other party should be given the opportunity to respond.’ [Citation.] Whether to accept new evidence with the reply papers is vested in the trial court's sound discretion, and we may reverse the trial court's decision only for a clear abuse of that discretion.” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 241 (Carbajal).)

Thus, the defendant failed its burden to establish the plaintiff was foreclosed from recovering his costs.

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You know about de novo review, and abuse of discretion, and substantial evidence. But have you heard of the "finding compelled as a matter of law" standard of review? Jeff Lewis and I discuss a recent case applying the standard with tenant-rights and appellate specialist Frances Campbell.

Watch the clip here.

This clip is from the California Appellate Law Podcast episode 18, available here.

Tim Kowal helps trial attorneys and clients win their cases and avoid error on appeal. He co-hosts the Cal. Appellate Law Podcast at www.CALPodcast.com, and publishes a newsletter of appellate tips for trial attorneys at www.tvalaw.com/articles. His appellate practice covers all of California's appellate districts and throughout the Ninth Circuit, with appellate attorneys in offices in Orange County and Monterey County. Contact Tim at tkowal@tvalaw.com or (714) 641-1232.

If you are involved in declaratory relief lawsuits, you might be confronted with the need for a stipulated judgment, as happened Tos v. State of California (D3 Nov. 30, 2021) ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___ 2021 WL 5576552 (no. C089466). The advice suggested in the case is particularly welcome because there are horror stories about stipulated judgments in other cases in both state courts and federal courts. So here is the right way to do it.

Tos challenged the constitutionality of California's high-speed rail bond act (as violative of restrictions on debt). Tos filed a complaint for declaratory relief, and then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Tos lost. That was the end of the line in the trial court for Tos. As the issues were purely legal, there was no point paying another fare. So Tos and the state stipulated to entry of judgment.

Now, under Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 402, the general rule is that stipulated judgments (or consent judgments) are not appealable. (E.g., a stipulation could moot the appeal.) And the horror scenario to be avoided is the *Kurwa v. Kislinger* trap. Yet there are exceptions to the rule. But sometimes the exceptions are not well-articulated. (Like in this recent case.)

But Tos v. California succinctly explains the exception, and finds that the stipulated judgment is appealable:

"The parties agree they entered into the stipulated judgment because all of the Tos parties’ claims depended on a determination that Assembly Bill No. 1889 is unconstitutional. The stipulated judgment is thus appealable under the exception in Norgart to the general rule that consent judgments are not appealable except where “ ‘consent was merely given to facilitate an appeal following adverse determination of a critical issue.’ ” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 400; Wilshire Ins. Co. v. Tuff Boy Holding, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 627, 634, fn. 6 [“The stipulated judgment, made to hasten appeal rather than settle the dispute, is appealable”].)"

Key Distinction: Here is the distinction between Kurwa v. Kislinger (applying the general rule that stipulated judgments are not appealable) and Tos (applying an exception to that rule). In Kurwa, there were other claims the plaintiff wanted to preserve, and so the parties entered into a tolling agreement for those claims, and the plaintiff dismissed them without prejudice. Also, the defendant had a pending cross-complaint. In Kurwa, it was clear the parties were simply "manufacturing appellate jurisdiction," rather than waiting for a final judgment as the law requires.

In contrast, in Tos the stipulated judgment disposed of the only claim in the case. There was no cross-complaint. The judgment was with prejudice to the plaintiff's claims. This satisfied the court that the parties were not attempting to "manufacture appellate jurisdiction" as happened in Kurwa.

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There have been many breathless reports of a coming "eviction tsunami" in the wake of Covid. But tenants' rights attorney and appellate specialist Frances Campbell says: take a deep breath. Fran tells Jeff Lewis and me why she thinks there is no eviction tsunami in the offing.

Watch the clip here.

This clip is from the California Appellate Law Podcast episode 18, available here.

The right to move for a new trial is an important right, developed from the common law, enshrined in statute, and respected by our courts. The recent case of Nickelson v. Nickelson (D2d2 Nov. 19, 2021) 2021 WL 5407839 (no. B302585) (nonpub. opn.) also respects the important right to move for new trial. You absolutely have the right to move for new trial. No question. But Nickelson says you don't have a right to a ruling on the motion.

Nickelson is a domestic violence case among adult siblings and their elderly father living together. Their dispute is a bit drawn out and a touch ridiculous, involving one sweeping trash into the other's room and the other hitting back with a stick of butter, and other injuries that appear only slightly more serious than that. After the appellant-brother's claim was dismissed after trial, he moved for new trial arguing his evidence should have been let in, including video and photographic evidence and medical reports.

Here is what the trial court did about the appellant's new trial motion: the judge told the appellant to just file an appeal instead. And then the judge took the new trial motion off calendar.

Now, as a rule, I do not take domestic violence cases – the cases say they are subject to the deferential abuse of discretion standard, but that is understatement because in fact they are reversed only for the abuse of a very, very, very broad discretion. But this is a different issue. Were the court to deny the motion for new trial, that would be subject to abuse of discretion. But refusing to decide the motion is an irregularity in the proceedings. A judge may not simply take a cause off calendar once it has been submitted. Recall that Government Code section 68210 requires that judges may not continue receiving a salary unless the judge swears, under oath, that "no cause before him remains pending and undetermined for 90 days after it has been submitted for decision."

The Nickelson court acknowledged that taking a matter off calendar is not the same thing as deciding the matter. “ ‘ “Off [c]alendar” is not synonymous with “dismissal.” “Off” merely means a postponement whereas a “dismissal” in judicial procedure has reference to a cessation of consideration’ ” (R & A Vending Services, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1188, 1193–1194).

But the court went on to note that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 660(c), where, as here, no order on a motion for new trial is entered within 75 days after the moving party's notice of intention, the motion is ultimately deemed denied by operation of law. That denial by operation of law is reviewable on appeal from the underlying judgment. (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 19.) So whether the trial judge ruled on the motion, or could not calendar it within the 75-days – or just pocket vetoed it as happened here – the effect is the same: the motion was denied.

And all denials of motions for new trial are reviewed the same way: abuse of discretion. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not considering any of the appellant's arguments? No, the Nickelson court held: "Here, all of the grounds raised in Maurice's motion for new trial were incorporated in his contentions on appeal, and we have given full consideration to them in our discussion of the issues raised by this appeal. We therefore conclude that no prejudice resulted to Maurice from the trial court's decision to take the motion for new trial off calendar."

Comment: I do not agree with the court's approach here. While it is true that a motion for new trial is denied by operation of law if not ruled on within 75 days after the notice of intent, I think the trial court's action here does not quite fit within the intention of this rule. The 75-day rule surely is not designed to allow trial judges to cavalierly disregard its duty to rule on new trial motions, as the trial court did here. Yes, the appellant had a statutory right to have the appellate court review the decision. But the appellant also had a statutory right to have the trial judge review the decision in the new trial motion. That right was disregarded, and not in a way that comported with ordinary discretion. This was an irregularity and an abuse of discretion.

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Did you know California landlord/tenant law is not clear on the basic question who has standing to bring eviction claims? Must the owner bring them, or may a property manager? Tenant-rights and appellate specialist Frances Campbell tells Jeff Lewis and Tim Kowal about a consequence of California's narrow standard governing what appellate opinions may be published. The cases deciding this question cannot be cited because they are technically "unpublished." California Rules of Court 8.1105 and 8.1115 create a "speakeasy" body of law: specialists know what the rule is, but they can't talk about.

Watch the clip here.

This clip is from the California Appellate Law Podcast episode 18, available here.

We discussed Marin Housing Authority v. Reilly on episode 14 of the California Appellate Law Podcast. Appellate attorney John Reeves joined us to discuss his amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court explaining why the California Supreme Court's 4-3 decision was incorrectly decided. The U.S. Solicitor General apparently agrees.

Reilly involves the question whether a public housing authority, in calculating a family’s annual income, is required to exclude Medicaid-funded payments made to a family by a state agency to allow the Section 8 tenant to provide personal caregiving services in order to keep a developmentally disabled family member at home.

David Ettinger reports that the Solicitor General filed a brief last week that the California Supreme Court engaged in "misreading both the plain text and the context of [the pertinent federal] regulation and rejecting [the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s] interpretation of its own regulation." Still, the Solicitor General recommends review be denied because the HUD is poised to render the decision moot by a new proposed rule.

But as John Reeves explained, the important question will remain: whether the size of the class entitled to HUD funding may be enlarged by judicial reinterpretation of the rules. As John pointed out, the funding is limited, so expansion of the class reduces the amount of money the intended recipients will receive.

Tim Kowal helps trial attorneys and clients win their cases and avoid error on appeal. He co-hosts the Cal. Appellate Law Podcast at www.CALPodcast.com, and publishes a newsletter of appellate tips for trial attorneys at www.tvalaw.com/articles. His appellate practice covers all of California's appellate districts and throughout the Ninth Circuit, with appellate attorneys in offices in Orange County and Monterey County. Contact Tim at tkowal@tvalaw.com or (714) 641-1232.

This topic comes up periodically, but it is still a little puzzling.

A complaint is filed. For one reason or another, the court dismisses the complaint without prejudice. But: the court does not sign the dismissal order. A dismissal order must be signed under Code of Civil Procedure section 581d. So the appeal from the unsigned dismissal is dismissed in Alaoui v. Vaynerman (D2d5 Nov. 8, 2021) 2021 WL 5175659 (no. B308421) (nonpub. opn.).

Here is why I say this is a little puzzling. True, section 581d requires that a mandatory dismissal be signed. (Voluntary dismissals need not be signed.) But in other cases where the case is effectively over but the trial court forgets the ministerial act of entering a judgment, appellate courts may simply deem the nonappealable order to be appealable. (E.g., Swain v. California Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 ["[B]ecause the order on summary judgment effectively disposed of the issues...we can amend it to do explicitly what it did only implicitly."]; Holt v. Booth (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1081 ["`[T]he [appellate] court may, in its discretion, where the intention of the trial court was clear, order judgment rather than send the case back for the performance of that act.'"] quoting Tsarnas v. Bailey (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 332, 337.)

So, why didn't the court simply deem the unsigned dismissal to be a signed dismissal here? (Or in Lee v. Medrano (D2d5 Feb. 24, 2021) No. B305536 (nonpub. opn.), involving a similar situation?)

Here is what I think. A dismissal without prejudice, even though involuntary, is still without prejudice. The words "without prejudice" mean something. Those words mean the claims may be brought again. That makes a mandatory dismissal without prejudice different from other nonappealable adjudications, like orders sustaining a demurrer, or orders granting summary judgment. Those orders cut off the plaintiff's right to refile the case, regardless of whether a judgment has been entered. As I explained here, orders that put the writing on the wall cut off the plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss and refile the action.

But a dismissal based on failure to prosecute, for example, does not have the same effect. The only remedy for failure to prosecute (Code Civ. Proc., § 581(b)(4)) and failure to appear at trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 581(b)(5)) is dismissal "without prejudice." Until such a dismissal is signed, the plaintiff may simply refile the action. That is why a dismissal without prejudice is not appealable. (Eaton Hydraulics Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 966, 974-975, fn. 6 ["A dismissal 'without prejudice' necessarily means without prejudice to the filing of a new action on the same allegations, so long as it is done within the period of the appropriate statute of limitations."].) The Aloui court further cites City of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Bd. (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 150, 157 [a dismissal order is appealable as a final judgment when the order complies with section 581d, which states “[a]ll dismissals ordered by the court shall be in the form of a written order signed by the court and filed in the action ....”]; Katzenstein v. Chabad of Poway (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 759, 768; Powell, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at 1577-1578.) Without a signed order of dismissal (or a judgment), we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal and must dismiss it. (Munoz v. Florentine Gardens (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1730, 1732.)

No mere ministerial act of the court can change that.

And that is (I think) the reason the appellate courts do not tend to simply "deem" unsigned mandatory dismissal orders to be appealable. Appellate courts only "deem" orders to be appealable when all that is standing in the way of the order becoming appealable is the trial court's ministerial act. But in the case of an unsigned dismissal based on a failure to prosecute, something else could happen: namely, the plaintiff may still refile the action. That act by the plaintiff would render the order nonfinal, and thus nonappealable.

The recognition that the plaintiff still has a role to play explains why the Court of Appeal concluded in Lee v. Medrano that "Plaintiff is thus free, if she wishes, to pursue whatever means she believes is most expedient to perfect her appeal." If a plaintiff, having been handed a dismissal for failure to prosecute the case, wants to resume the case, the plaintiff need simply refile the case. A trip to the Court of Appeal is not necessary.

But What If the Dismissal Renders the Claims Time-Barred?

The more practical problem with a dismissal without prejudice is it may render claims barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. That may be why the plaintiff in Alaoui moved to set aside the dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. But the denial of that motion was not appealable because the underlying order — the unsigned dismissal — was not signed and thus nonappealable. There must be a valid underlying final judgment when relying on the statutory provision that authorizes an appeal from a post-judgment order. (See, e.g., Generale Bank Nederland v. Eyes of the Beholder Ltd. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1394; see also Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1578 (Powell).)

What the plaintiff probably needed to do here (and may still do on remand) is to make a record that the claims will be time-barred in the event the trial court does not reinstate the complaint (if indeed that is the case). Armed with that record, the plaintiff may argue in the Court of Appeal that the dismissal does in fact operate as a final adjudication of the claims.

The rules of appellate procedure are curious already, but what about appeals in limited civil cases? Curiouser and curiouser. Tenants' rights attorney and appellate specialist Frances Campbell discusses the important differences in appeals in the Appellate Division of the California Superior Court with appellate attorneys Jeff Lewis and Tim Kowal.

Watch the clip here.

This clip is from the California Appellate Law Podcast episode 18, available here.

If you work in court, you have seen the basic template for submitting written objections to evidence supporting a motion. It is the chart where is listed the objectionable matter, the objection, and a space for the judge to indicate whether the objection is "sustained/overruled." When you need one of these, you probably search your computer for the last one you did and get to work, without much thought to whether the format of the chart is quite correct.

Time for a systems check. In Scofield v. Hanson Bridgett LLP (D3 Nov. 8, 2021) 2021 WL 5176140 (no. C081115) (nonpub. opn.), a plaintiff's written evidentiary objections, filed in response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, were overruled because they "fail[ed] to number the objections consecutively," and did not provide a "space for the court to date or sign its rulings." And on appeal, the court held this ruling on pure formatting grounds was within the trial court's discretion: A court does not abuse its discretion in holding a party to the mandatory formatting requirements or in declining to give a party a second chance to file properly formatted objections. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8-9.)

Here is the formatting rule:

Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b) dictates the format for evidentiary objections: “All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. Objections on specific evidence must be referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement. Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must: [¶] (1) Identify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located; [¶] (2) State the exhibit, title, page and line number of the material objected to; [¶] (3) Quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material; and [¶] (4) State the grounds for each objection to that statement or material.” Rule 3.1354(c) requires a proposed order for the court to rule on each objection.

Here is one of the visuals included with the rule itself:

Here, in addition to forgetting to number the objections and failing to include a space for the judge to sign, the objecting party also included a "brief explanatory argument" with the objections, which runs afoul of rule 3.1354 ("[T]he objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement.").

The court also noted that the evidence probably didn't affect the outcome anyway, and there was some grounds for finding the evidence had foundation. Trial counsel always appreciate those explanations from the courts, because it means they do not have to explain to their clients that their technical oversight was responsible for the loss.

Note: The plaintiff-appellate advocated, as does this commentator, that a trial court's evidentiary rulings should be reviewed de novo, not for abuse of discretion. The authority for this is Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512. In Reid, the Supreme Court applied de novo review to evidentiary objections made at summary judgment, but not ruled upon by the trial court and which the prevailing party expressly invited the court to consider. (Id. at p. 535.) Reid's holding was limited, and neither situation that existed in Reid existed in this case. And enforcing formatting rules is a matter of discretion. So abuse of discretion is the correct standard here. But otherwise, advocates should keep pushing the Reid rule. Foundation and hearsay offered at trial or in MSJs are not matters of discretion, and appellate courts ought to stop treating them as though they are.

Takeaway: Before you prepare another set of written evidentiary objections, review Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b). It has a handy visual of what the chart should look like.

Tenants' rights attorney and appellate specialist Frances Campbell gives appellate attorneys Jeff Lewis and Tim Kowal a lesson in "HateWriting": harnessing that exquisite state of agitated frisson to produce a legal brief that will leave a mark without, after a final edit for overheated adverbs, drawing admonitions.

Watch the clip here.

This clip is from the California Appellate Law Podcast episode 18, available here.